The concept of “the banality of evil” devised by Hannah Arendt half a century ago and indelibly linked to her mistaken characterization of Adolf Eichmann has remained both popular and controversial. Although the concept preceded the rise of the postmodern sensibility and the associated moral relativism, it has considerable affinity with both. Its popularity among Western intellectuals has two likely explanations. In the first place “the banality of evil” had a refreshing, iconoclastic, and demystifying aspect, and carried the promise of originality. It sent the message—always welcome by intellectuals—that there is a gulf between appearance and reality, that things are not what they seem to be, that even evil can be deconstructed, and those personifying it recast as mundane or banal. When first introduced, the concept was defiantly unconventional as it linked two hitherto opposed concepts: evil and banality.

Arendt proposed (largely on the basis of attending Eichmann’s trial) that he was nota diabolical, determined, and diligent mass murderer prompted by evil intentions and destructive ideas, but a very ordinary man, a faceless bureaucrat, a cog in a huge machine, obedient servant of higher authorities unconcerned with the goals and results of the services he rendered. There was nothing remarkable, distinctive, or monstrous about him, he was interchangeable with countless other bureaucrats (“desk murderers”) similarly engaged and bereft of moral concerns. Arendt emphasized with a peculiar eagerness, even relish, that anyone, under similar circumstances, belonging to a similar organization and placed in a similar situation would have