Extreme relativism probably isn’t explicitly accepted by even the most scatterbrained of postmodernists or sociologists of science. Most postmodern views certainly lead to extreme relativism, and in some cases amount to little more than extreme relativism expressed in the most indirect and pretentious manner possible, but postmodernists do their best to hide these facts from themselves and will rarely admit to any such view when pressed, at least in public. But plenty of people, postmodern or otherwise, would profess to accept some sort of mild, limited relativism. What’s more, such views are no longer restricted to disgruntled left-wingers who are overly susceptible to the latest intellectual fashions. Plenty of sober, considered, and conservative thinkers now think of themselves as accepting some form of limited relativism.
Many truths, to be sure, are contingent, which no one would deny.
A typical example of this phenomenon appeared in the pages of Australia’s bastion of serious conservative thought, the journal Quadrant: “Relativism and the Right” by Sam Roggeveen, March 2000. Not only does Roggeveen defend a form of mild relativism, he also deliberately presents himself as a model of restraint, caution, and reason. We can take it, then, as a useful starting point for a discussion of “mild” relativism. Roggeveen claims that what he is defending is a “relativism of sorts”:
It is a relativism which says that there is such a thing as truth, but that this truth is contingent, dependent on particular inescapable historical circumstances