The task of the writer in Latin America has never been an easy one. In some countries literacy hardly surmounts functional levels; in others, where it far exceeds them, there still is not much of a public for which one can write. There are few serious universities or, literary reviews, and the book trade is one of the most perilous occupations imaginable, subject to the anomalies of paper supplies, exchange controls, price controls, and a minuscule market. It is perhaps unflattering to say so, but Latin Americans are not great readers of books: instead, they consume huge quantities of newsprint, café gossip, and conspiracy theories. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the region has also produced some world-class writers, and shows every indication of continuing to do so.
In some ways, of course, the foregoing merely describes the situation of literature in any area of the Third World. But in one important regard, Latin America is quite different from, say, Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia: Latin Americans are more firmly situated within the Western literary tradition. Even so, one should not make too much of this: in some ways the region has more in common with other non-Western areas than we think. This leads to much confusion on the part of American and Western European readers, who are often taken in by false labels, and misunderstand the spirit underlying much of Latin American literary work. Nonetheless, Latin American literature has succeeded in gaining a foothold in mainstream Western culture, as a kind of exotic cousin whom we feel obliged to admit to our table. The relationship is sometimes based more on courtesy, guilt, and misunderstanding than on genuine affinity, but the writers themselves would be foolish indeed not to take advantage of it.
The subject of literature and politics in Latin America is, of course, extraordinarily broad.
The subject of literature and politics in Latin America is, of course, extraordinarily broad. Yet a few ruthless generalizations will serve as a point of departure. The image of the writer as an independent critic of society and power, or as a voice in the wilderness defending humanistic and liberal values against an established order of violence and greed, is greatly exaggerated. Indeed, most writers in Latin America have been unusually drawn to power, for reasons both of economic necessity and cultural predisposition. Further, at least since the turn of the century, they have been particularly attracted to non-liberal or anti-liberal ideologies. More recently, their anti-liberal bias has been positively encouraged by the literary establishments in Western Europe and the United States. And finally, a new generation of liberal voices has succeeded in making itself heard in Mexico, in Peru, in the Southern Cone republics. But the future of this generation remains extremely problematic. In this article I propose to comment at length on each of these propositions.
Popular tradition places the roots of censorship in Latin America deep in the colonial period, when the Spanish authorities forbade the importation of works of creative imagination. It is true that Latin Americans were expected from the very start to subsist on a steady diet of sermons, writings of the Church fathers, and lives of the saints (some of which, actually, were very nearly pornographic). There was also, however, from the very beginning an underground trade in other books; the first copies of Cervantes’s Don Quixote, for example, were smuggled to the New World in crates supposedly containing bottles of wine. This serves as a useful illustration of the limits of censorship, which—like almost every other aspect of government in the region—has never worked the way it is supposed to.
To be sure, over the years there have been instances in which individual tides have been prohibited, or even physically destroyed, sometimes with considerable brio. These episodes have captured the momentary attention of the Western cultural public. For example, copies of Mario Vargas Llosa’s first novel, The Time of the Hero (1963), were publicly burned at the military academy in Peru where much of its action takes place. The incident was seized upon by its American publisher to promote the work of a (then) unknown writer. The junta in Chile staged a widely reported (and photographed) book-burning episode shortly after the coup in 1973, and has seized and destroyed several book shipments since then. Despite such incidents, however, censorship has been a less serious threat to literature in Peru, Chile, and elsewhere than other things, including indifference, popular taste, and economic constraints. Only in Cuba and (until yesterday) Nicaragua has literature been conscripted into rigorous service to the state.
Dramatic individual instances of censorship mask a more important fact about the literary estate in Latin America—namely, that in most cases the relationship between writers and power has been symbiotic. During the first century of independence, literary skills of any kind were a monopoly of urban elites who dominated national affairs. Many writers were also presidents, generals, ministers, ambassadors, or prefects. While individual writers were persecuted and sometimes driven into exile, this was due to their affiliation with the party out of power, not to the allegedly subversive content of their work. Moreover, in the absence of a broad economic base to support an independent or semi-independent intellectual class, writers had no choice but to recur to the State for economic subsistence. This point is particularly well established in Doris Meyer’s recent anthology, Lives on the Line: The Testimony of Contemporary Latin American Authors.1 Starting in the nineteenth century, but continuing well into the twentieth, many Latin American governments maintained writers on the national budget, often as consuls or even ministers at overseas legations; for example, Rubén Darío, the greatest voice of Spanish-American poetry, was happy to edit the official daily of the oligarchical regime in neighboring El Salvador, and, later, to represent the dictator of his own country, Jose Santos Zelaya, at the Court of Madrid. “He lived side by side with idiotic and reactionary politicians,” Cuban novelist Alejo Carpentier later observed, “whoring generals whom he found agreeable and even interesting.” (The comment loses none of its impact by the fact that Carpentier himself later did exactly the same thing for Fidel Castro, for whom he served as ambassador to France.)
The Colombian poet José Santos Chocano served as a diplomatic agent for the Mexican bandit-cum-revolutionary Pancho Villa, and, even more deplorably, for Manuel Estrada Cabrera, ruthless dictator of Guatemala from 1905 to 1920. Successive Chilean governments maintained another great poet, Pablo Neruda, by offering him minor diplomatic postings in the Netherlands Indies and in Spain, and they did the same for his colleague, also a Nobel laureate, Gabriela Mistral. Jorge Luis Borges for years worked at the Buenos Aires Public Library, and subsequently became the director of Argentina’s National Library.
The phenomenon is by no means limited to “conservative” Latin American governments or to the military dictatorships of the Right.
The phenomenon is by no means limited to “conservative” Latin American governments or to the military dictatorships of the Right. Indeed the first Latin American government to recruit writers and artists systematically for specifically political purposes was a government of the Left–revolutionary Mexico of the 1920s and 1930s. The Mexican phenomenon deserves more than passing reference because it embodies the finished model to which so many other Latin American governments and political parties secretly aspire: a one-party state that dominates both its military institutions and its labor movement; that elevates corruption to a system; that deftly conjugates a left-wing foreign policy with a right-wing domestic policy; and that preemptively eliminates criticism from abroad by accusing skeptical foreigners (particularly Americans), of racism, imperialism, or “lack of mutual respect.” In some respects what historians call the Mexican revolution (1910-40) was not notably different from other struggles for power in that country save for its duration, geographical extent, and the degree of physical and human damage inflicted upon a helpless population. But the new Mexian authorities understood (as their predecessors did not) that in order to create enduring institutions, it was necessary to conscript cultural workers, particularly writers and artists. These in turn could be used to create a facade of broad philosophical meaning or what in many ways was nothing but a pillaging expedition which culminated in the creation of a new class of “revolutionary” millionaires.
By nationalizing large sectors of the nation’s economy, the new government evidently acquired vast control over culture; no newspaper could survive without advertising from state enterprises, or even go to press without newsprint from paper companies that were also now “socially owned.”